"And if they hate then let 'em hate and watch the money pile up"For months now, observers of Russia's sclerotic democracy have wondered exactly how President Vladimir Putin would handle the transition of power imposed upon him by constitutionally mandated term limits. Most have predicted that Putin would anoint his successor, much the way that Boris Yeltsin anointed Putin before the 2000 election. The real question is how he would seek to retain his considerable influence in a new government. Now we have our answer: President Putin will head the United Russia party's ticket in the upcoming parliamentary election.
Most predictions had Putin altering the constitution to allow himself a third term as President - he certainly has the votes in the Duma (Russia's parliament) to do it - or following the model of China's Deng Xiaoping, who controlled China for nearly two decades without holding any official office. Instead, Putin has forged a compromise between these two options, allowing him to retain government office and, presumably, power while maintaining the outward appearance of the rule of law. Putin has already made noises about seeking the post of Prime Minister, suggesting that he will seek to reorient the power structure of Russia's government around this office; any doubts that his successor will be chosen solely on the basis of his subservience have thus been completely expunged. Furthermore, Russia's constitution only prohibits Putin from serving a third consecutive term as president; after he kicks around as PM for four years, he is free to seek the presidency again. This would help explain the recent elevation of Viktor Zubkov, a non-entity entirely dependent upon the Putin machine, to the Prime Minister's spot - the on-deck circle for the Russian presidency.
Western alarmists, many of whom relish the opportunity to break the well-worn rhetoric of the Cold War out of mothballs, view Putin's presidency as one long backslide to the tensions of Soviet era. Indeed, Russia has moved distinctively away from the West under Putin, bolstered both by burgeoning oil and natural gas revenues and the precipitous decline of American prestige and influence in the early 21st century. Recently, Russia has utilized its mineral wealth to blackmail its former satellites into submission, attempted to lay a rather eccentric claim to the Arctic and the valuable natural resources beneath it, and announced the resumption of round-the-clock nuclear bomber patrols - a step right out of Dr. Strangelove.
However, this increasing assertiveness does not necessarily signal a return to the dark days of runaway ideological and military competition; an antagonistic relationship with America would profit Russia very little. As Hunter S. Thompson once said, an outlaw is someone who lives beyond the law but not necessarily against it: Putin has adhered to this formulation by detaching Russia from the Western orbit, and establishing Moscow as the center of its own system. This development is of a piece with the unfolding reality of a new multipolar world: Beijing, New Delhi, Moscow, and Brussels are all rapidly developing their own spheres of influence, quickly marking the end of the brief era when Washington's global superiority and leadership were uncontested. That Putin fails to tow Washington's line says more about America's waning influence than it does about Putin's perfidy; as our ability to project power abroad is sapped away in the sands of Iraq, the price of maintaining relatively sound relations with the U.S. has swiftly declined.Most predictions had Putin altering the constitution to allow himself a third term as President - he certainly has the votes in the Duma (Russia's parliament) to do it - or following the model of China's Deng Xiaoping, who controlled China for nearly two decades without holding any official office. Instead, Putin has forged a compromise between these two options, allowing him to retain government office and, presumably, power while maintaining the outward appearance of the rule of law. Putin has already made noises about seeking the post of Prime Minister, suggesting that he will seek to reorient the power structure of Russia's government around this office; any doubts that his successor will be chosen solely on the basis of his subservience have thus been completely expunged. Furthermore, Russia's constitution only prohibits Putin from serving a third consecutive term as president; after he kicks around as PM for four years, he is free to seek the presidency again. This would help explain the recent elevation of Viktor Zubkov, a non-entity entirely dependent upon the Putin machine, to the Prime Minister's spot - the on-deck circle for the Russian presidency.
Western alarmists, many of whom relish the opportunity to break the well-worn rhetoric of the Cold War out of mothballs, view Putin's presidency as one long backslide to the tensions of Soviet era. Indeed, Russia has moved distinctively away from the West under Putin, bolstered both by burgeoning oil and natural gas revenues and the precipitous decline of American prestige and influence in the early 21st century. Recently, Russia has utilized its mineral wealth to blackmail its former satellites into submission, attempted to lay a rather eccentric claim to the Arctic and the valuable natural resources beneath it, and announced the resumption of round-the-clock nuclear bomber patrols - a step right out of Dr. Strangelove.
The truly troubling aspect of Putin's power grab is the implications it holds for the future of constitutional democracy and the rule of law in Russia. Westerners looked at the Orange Revolution in the Ukraine and the Rose Revolution in the Georgian Republic and saw the triumph of liberal democracy; Putin saw in those events the triumph of the West. While never a liberal democrat to begin with, Putin has since intensified his stranglehold on authority in Russia. The oligarchs who profited most from the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and hence possessed the largest concentration of power outside of the Kremlin, were intimidated into compliance with the regime by the political prosecution of billionaire oil magnate and Yukos CEO Mikhail Khodorkovsky on trumped up tax evasion charges. Members of the media who have been critical of Putin's government have been brutalized and even murdered; all of these cases remain "unresolved." Even dissidents beyond Russia's borders are not beyond Putin's reach: Alexander Litvenenko, an ex-KGB officer sharply critical of the President, was famously poisoned with Polonium-210 while dining at a London sushi restaurant. Polonium is an unusual choice for a murder weapon, because it is highly traceable, both in the sense that it leaves easily detected amounts of radiation wherever it has been, and its place of original manufacture is simply determined; anyone using it would be seeking to send a message. Sure enough, both sets of clues led directly back to Russia, where the authorities stonewalled British investigators seeking further information.
What opposition the regime permits is scattered and highly ineffective. In a recent New Yorker profile of former chess world champion and opposition leader Garry Kasparov, the movement is depicted as an incoherent amalgam of radicals, social outsiders, and strident intellectuals more interested in holding kitchen table debates than any of the fundamentals of political organizing. They have collected under the banner of umbrella organization Other Russia, which seems to function as an Island of Misfit Toys in Putin's Russia. They hold their conference in a Holiday Inn, besieged by the pro-Putin Young Guards, who shower them with fake American currency and call them "political prostitutes"; "neo-Bolshevik" leader Eduard Litvinov is a "problematic partner" who bummed around America for two decades, "modeling himself on Charles Bukowski"; Vladimir Bukovsky, a prestigious former Soviet political prisoner oft-mentioned as a potential presidential candidate, delivered his speech via videotape, having resided in the UK since his release from the camps in 1976; Kasparov admits that “We’re not trying to win elections yet. It’s all about having elections, real elections.” Far from serving as an effective check on the enormously popular Putin, Other Russia's main challenge is merely remaining (or becoming) relevant enough to prevent Russia from becoming a one party state.
Further complicating matters is the degree to which Putin has managed to make the state an extension of himself. He has peopled the top layers of government with his former KGB colleagues, though as Putin himself pointed out, making reference to the Lenin-era Soviet secret police, "Once a Chekist, always a Chekist." Indeed, the Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti has not only survived the collapse of the Soviet regime (of which it was perhaps the defining feature), but has developed into the dominant institution in Russian political life: there are credible estimates that have "former" KGB men in 60% of all Kremlin jobs. The state controlled media serves as a propaganda arm of the Kremlin; the independent media, controlled as it is by oligarchs loyal to Putin, is little better. High level positions with state-owned enterprises such as Gazprom (natural gas) and Rosneft (oil) are lucrative baubles handed out to regime loyalists. The Duma, intended as a check on executive power, is instead in thrall to Putin; Russia's regional governors, once elected by their constituents, are now directly appointed by Putin, as are the mayors of St. Petersburg and Moscow.
One thing remains perfectly clear: as long as Russia's economic prosperity continues apace, Putin will likely enjoy all the domestic support he requires to remain in power. I don't necessarily buy the argument that Russia requires a strong man to govern it - this is the same brand of Western condescension that suggests that democracy can never take hold in the Arab world. However, in the centuries that Russia has been a distinct polity, it has almost constantly been governed by autocrats: 300 years of Romanovs, followed by another 74 years of communism. Something approximating liberal democracy has been in place on two occasions: the eight month interlude between Tsar Nicholas' abdication and the October Revolution in 1917 when the provisional government of Alexander Kerensky ruled, and the eight years of the Yeltsin era. Neither of these experiences was particularly auspicious: Kerensky, who continued to prosecute the highly unpopular First World War, was unable to halt the collapse of Russian society that had forced the Tsar's departure, and throughout Yeltsin's presidency the nation was wracked continuously by economic crises, corruption, and gangsterism. It's safe to say that these antecedents may not have sufficiently whetted Russia's appetite for democracy to the point where they would trade in the known quantity of Putin's rule - marked by general stability and increased prosperity - for it.
I guess they don't know what they're missing.
